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U.S. Nuclear Power Industry,
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ABSTRACT
This articlereviews and assesses the relationshipbetween federal regulation and environmental impact of the U.S. nuclear power industry
from 1974 through 1984. Analysis of Nuclear Regulatory Commission
data suggests that substantialprogress was made in reducing the aggregate annualdischargesof some isotopes despite substantialexpansion of

the industry, However, because of long radioactive half-lives, a number
of these emitted isotopes were accumulatingenvironmentally at the same
time. Several policy conclusions appear to follow from these empirical

trends.
INTRODUCTION
The era of private nuclear energy in the United States began in 1957
with federal licensing of the Shippingport, Pennsylvania power reactor

operated by Duquesne .Light Company. From its inception, the nuclear
power industry was subject to federal safety regulation, with the 1954
Atomic Energy Act requiring measures "to protect the health and safety
of the public."' In part because of federal R&D spending, limited liability
of utility investors under the Price-Anderson Act, 2 and federally subsidized uranium fuel enrichment, the nuclear industry expanded rapidly
and, 20 years after its birth, supplied over eleven percent of electricity

generated in the United States (see Table 1).
*Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire, Durham. NH.
**Department of Economics, Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Lynchburg, VA.
***The authors would like to thank Mr. Terry Bensel for his research assistance and Professors
William Freudenburg, James Horrigan, and Dennis Meadows for their comments. We also gratefully
acknowledge financial support by the Institute for Policy and Social Science Research and the
Whittemore School of Business and Economics at the University of New Hampshire.
1. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ch. 1073,68 Star. 919 (1954) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2011
(1980)). As Mazuzan and Walker have noted, however, in their history of the early days of nuclear
regulation. President Eisenhower favored limited federal regulation in order to promote private
investment in the nuclear power industry, and -Congress followed his advice.... They used broad
statutory language and left implementation to the experts. . ,. Although the goal of protecting public
health and safety was cited frequently throughout the act, the legislative history revealed little
discussion on ... the dangers to health and safety." G. Mazuzan & J. Walker, Controlling the
Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation 1946-1962. at 30 (1985),
2. Anderson-Price Atomic Energy Damages Act. 42 U.S.C. §2012 (1988).
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This general expansion of U.S. nuclear power production was accompanied by two noteworthy trends and events. First, although two reactor
technologies competed for utility investment dollars until the early 1970s,
the pressurized water design had decisively defeated its boiling water

rival by the early 1980s. Second, the March 1979 accident at Three Mile
Island, Pennsylvania "was a traumatic event for the American public"
and "had a profound effect on the public, the utilities, [and] the nuclear
industry .... ""
In this article we propose to describe and assess federal regulation of
private nuclear power and its environmental impact in light of the industry's evolving technology, the trauma of Three Mile Island (TMI),
and reforms in the federal regulatory effort. As part of our research project,
we have analyzed data on radioactive emissions from U.S. nuclear power
plants to see whether federal regulation has been adequate. Our period
of data analysis runs from 1974 through 1984, an interval dictated by
availability of complete published data, but one which permits comparison
of the pre-TMI and post-TMI regulatory situations in some detail. We
conclude with a discussion of some policy implications of the regulatory
and environmental history of commercial nuclear power in the United
States.
FEDERAL REGULATION OF NUCLEAR EMISSIONS
Before focusing on the period from 1974 through 1984, it is important

to mention one important facet of the early history of U.S. nuclear power.
This is the relatively lax regulatory stance of the U.S. Atomic Energy

Commission (AEC) versus private nuclear plant operators, a stance which
persisted into the 1970s. Cohn reports as follows:
Because the activities of the AEC were initially directed towards
expanded weapons production and bomb testing, and then towards
the rapid commercialization of nuclear power, the Commission placed
a relatively low priority on hazard data collection. .... Minimal
monitoring oversaw industry [radioactive] release levels. ... Centralized AEC funding of radiation research also encouraged a methodological inbreeding which underestimated the scope of nuclear
hazards.'
Mazuzan and Walker report in a similar vein that President Eisenhower
had explicitly sought minimal federal regulation for the infant nuclearpower industry of the late 1950s:
3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Licensed Operating Reactors, Status Summary Report.
Vols. 1-9 (1977-84); U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n. Radioactive Materials Released from Nuclear Power Plants. Annual Report (1974-77).
4. I NRC Ann. Rep. 1-2 (1979).
5. S. Cohn. The Political Economy of Nuclear Power 1946-82 (1986) (University of Massachusetts

Ph.D. Thesis).
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Minimum regulation that protected national security and public health

and safety appeared as the only logical way to proceed if the new
industry was to be allowed the necessary flexibility to develop fully.'
Hence, encouragement of a new industrial technology, and not regulation
of its environmental impact, seems to have been the primary concern of
the AEC during the infancy of nuclear power in the United States.7
Several developments during the 1960s, however, eventually led to
tightening of federal regulation of the industry. One was the growing
popular concern about potential radiation hazards, an awareness which
resulted from the atomic bomb testing controversy of the early 1960s.
Public apprehension about growing levels of strontium-90 and other forms
of fallout from atmospheric bomb tests fed "growing misgivings about
the AEC's performance in safeguarding public health." ' Another important development was the discovery by environmental critics of commercial nuclear power that they could use AEC licensing hearings to raise
public doubts about the safety of proposed reactors.' Still another development favoring stricter federal regulation was the growing. rejection
by radiation scientists of an earlier hypothesis that a perfectly safe threshold dose of individual radiation exposure exists.'"
By the early 1970s, the AEC began-in the face of growing public
scrutiny and criticism--to adopt a more active regulatory stance and to
rely less on self-policing by nuclear utility licensees. Freudenburg and
Baxter point out, for example, that whereas the AEC had fewer than a
dozen active regulations in 1970, there were several dozen by 1972, and
several hundred by 1977." In a purely administrative sense, then, the
AEC abandoned its earlier laissezfairephilosophy of nuclear regulation
roughly 15 years after the inception of commercial nuclear power. Whether
this shift in regulatory philosophy resulted in stricter constraints on licensee behavior is not so clear, however. Indeed, there is some evidence
which' suggests that the appearance of tighter federal regulation of the
nuclear power industry during the 1970s was, in part, illusory. Before
the 1979 TMI accident, for example, the AEC and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relied almost completely on licensee mea6.

G. Mazuzan & J. Walker, supra note i, at 91-92.
7. See also Freudenburg & Baxter, Nuclear Reactions: Public Attitudes and Policies Toward
Nuclear Power. 5 Policy Studies Rev. 97-98 (1985).
8. G. Mazuzan & J. Walker, supra note I. at 246.
9. Cohn observed that Idjuring the mid-sixties critics gained a public platform for hazard discussion in 16 radiation related plant licensing challenges." S. Cohn, supra note 5. at 297.
10. According to Cohn, although the AEC had previously asserted that the human body could
safely receive repeated small doses of radiation without any harm, that threshold hypothesis retained
few scientific supporters by the mid 1970s. S. Cohn, supra note 5. at 329.
I1. Freudenburg & Baxter, supra note 7. at 99. The 1977 figure presumably includes older AEC
regulations and newer regulations issued by the recently created U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).
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surements of radioactive emissions from operating power reactors.' 2 Not
until fiscal 1980 did the NRC install 50 dosimeters around each operating

plant in order to collect its own independent measurements of plant emissions.' 3 Hence, the 1975 NRC claim that nuclear plant emissions were
normally "small fractions of the limits set forth in NRC regulations"' "
is subject to some degree of uncertainty."
Furthermore, as the General Accounting Office (GAO) noted in a 1979
report, the NRC received and filed numerous reports on operating conditions furnished by licensees but did not adequately analyze and assess
those sources of data. Hence, according to the GAO, "the NRC does
not know if it is promptly finding and identifying all potential safetyrelated problems."' 6 After this GAO critique and the TMI accident, the
NRC established its own Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational
Data and declared that regulating the operation of nuclear plants, not just
their design and construction, was among its top priorities. 7
This is not to suggest, of course, that federal regulation of operating
nuclear plants during the 1970s was purely illusory. As Table 2 verifies,
NRC spending on inspection and enforcement activity per licensed reactor
grew substantially in real terms during the latter half of the decade. In
addition, the NRC inaugurated its resident inspector program in 1977,
thereby guaranteeing some degree of regular on-site inspection at licensed
nuclear plants."' The 1977 Clean Air Act"9 extended the jurisdiction of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to include radioactive emissions, thereby subjecting nuclear utilities to some degree of EPA scrutiny.' At the end of 1978, the NRC and EPA began to develop preliminary
plans for a program of epidemiological research on the health effects of
low-level radiation, as required by the fiscal 1979 NRC Authorization
Act.' Feinstein's finding that NRC regulations "matter," that is, help to
12. S. Cohn, supra note 5, at 328.
13. I NRC Ann. Rep. 14143 (1980).
14. 1 NRC Ann. Rep. 46 (1975).
15. This judgment may seem somewhat harsh, but a post-TMI inquiry by the NRC revealed that
emission monitoring efforts by Metropolitan Edison had been far from perfect. More specifically.
several measurement instruments went off scale during the accident and a number of filters used to
measure iodine-131 releases were lost or spoiled during handling. Hence. we do not know precisely
how much radioactivity was released during the TMI accident, although the NRC estimates emissions
of 2.5 million curies of krypton and xenon gases and 15 curies of iodine- 13 1. Special Inquiry Group,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n. Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and the Public.
vol. I at 153, vol. II at 335-38, 360 (1980) [hereinafter Special Inquiry Groupl.
16. I NRC Ann. Rep. 90 (1980).
17. I NRCAnn. Rep. 1,5 (1979).
18. Id. at 6.
19. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.L. No 97-375 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401642 (1988)).
20. In late 1979, EPA standards for public exposure to radiation became effective. Most nuclear
plants that already satisfied existing NRC standards met the new EPA regulations. I NRC Ann. Rep.
100 (1979).
21. 1 NRC Ann. Rep. 2 (1978).
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reduce the frequency of "abnormal occurrences" at nuclear power plants,
suggests that these inspection and enforcement efforts had a tangible
impact on public safety. 22

After the accident at Three Mile Island, popular support in the United
States for nuclear power fell from almost two-to-one in favor to roughly
an even split between supporters and opponents. 23 This deteriorating political situation prompted various actions by the NRC. In addition to
inaugurating its own reactor emission monitoring program, the NRC
required licensees to install additional instrumentation for measuring radioactive releases.24 The Commission also expanded its resident inspector
program at operating reactors, with 136 personnel stationed at 76 sites
by late 1980.2 Feinstein reports that NRC efforts to detect violations of
its safety regulations increased sharply in the aftermath of TMI.6
Implementation of the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications
(RETS) program also proceeded during the early 1980s. As the NRC
noted in 1983:
These plant-specific requirements will formalize the commitment of
each licensee to the long-standing safety concept that radioactive
releases from nuclear power plants shall be as low as reasonably

achievable and have a minimal effect on the surrounding environment. . . . By the end of fiscal year 1983, about one-half of the
operating nuclear reactors had submitted and gained technical approval for the specifications. 2'

Given these and other federal regulatory actions, the U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) was moved to conclude in 1984, "[nuclear
power is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the United
States .

"2

22. Feinstein. The Safety Regulation of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Violations. Inspections, and
Abnormal Occurrences. 97 J. Pol. Econ. 115. 117-18 (1989).
23. Freudenburg & Baxter, supra note 7,at 104-05. Interestingly, this even split in public opinion
lasted through the end of 1981. Polls taken after early 1982 showed a further slump in pro-nuclear
sentiment, with opponents outnumbering supporters roughly two-to-one. Id.
24. I NRC Ann. Rep. 5 (1979).
25. I NRCAnn. Rep. 11-12(1980).
26. Feinstein, supra note 22, at 139.
27. I NRC Ann. Rep. 29 (1983). Implementation of the RETS program followed a lengthy
planning and bargaining process which had begun in 1978 involving the NRC staff and plant licensees.
I NRC Ann. Rep. 49 (1978). The longstanding goal of nuclear emissions "as low as reasonably
achievable" (ALARA), we should point out, was to be pursued within a benefit-cost framework of
analysis. As the Commissioners had stated in their first annual report. "Iblalancing the benefits of
nuclear activities against safety, security and environmental costs and risks in the public interest is
tfle heart of NRC decisionmaking. The Commission believes... that consideration of the administrative and economic burdens of regulatory actions can and should be part of the decisionmaking
process." I NRC Ann. Rep. 4 (1975). Hence, the NRC never committed itself to minimizing nuclear
emissions regardless of economic cost when it embraced the ALARA goal.
28. U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty (1984).
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RADIOACTIVE EMISSIONS AND NUCLEAR POWER

Whether intensification of federal regulation of nuclear power since
the 1950s has actually resulted in "risks from normal operation and from
accidents [which] are extremely low" ' - is not obvious, however. Analyzing that issue would require looking at all releases of radioactivity by
nuclear power plants, whether routine or exceptional, and assessing their
environmental and public health impact. We do not claim to have conducted that assessment in its entirety, but our empirical research does,
we believe, raise serious questions about the adequacy of NRC regulation
of nuclear power."
Over a thousand radioisotopes are known, and hundreds of those are
routinely generated and sometimes emitted by nuclear power plants. As
noted in Table 3, we have selected six of those numerous radioactive
materials for detailed study: tritium, iron-55, cobalt-60, krypton-85,
strontium-90, and cesium-137. This selection was guided in large part
by three criteria: (i) availability of official emissions data, (ii) potential
health risk once an isotope has been emitted, and (iii) lengthy radioactive
half-life, so that any discharge persists in the environment for some time.
Fifty percent of an emission of cesium-137, for example, is still radioactive in that form nearly 30 years after its discharge. While in the
environment, it can enter food chains and reach humans via milk, cereals,
meat. leafy vegetables and seafoods." Because of biological concentration processes, the edible parts of fish and shellfish have a cesium content
at least 50 times greater than its concentration in surrounding waters.'
As noted in Table 3,cesium- 137 has been judged to be of moderate
toxicity relative to other radioactive substances.
Strontium-90 has a slightly shorter physical half-life than cesium-137,
and hence somewhat less than 50 percent of an emission will remain in
the environment in this form after three decades. Strontium-90 is generally
recognized to be extremely toxic to humans, in part because of its tendency
to concentrate in bone marrow after having been ingested in milk, meat,
29. I NRC Ann. Rep. 2 (1977).
30. We cannot claim to have measured the public health impact of the nuclear power industry
since that would have required a large-scale, multi-stage, inter-disciplinary research project far beyond
our limited resources including: (I)collection of location.specific emissions data, (2) use of those
emissions data as inputs to models of physical dispersion and biological concentration in order to
predict the spatial distribution of environmental inventories of radionuclides with long lives, and (3)
pursuit of epidemiological research to link those predictions to location-specific public health data.
31. G. Choppin & J. Rydberg, Nuclear Chemistry-Theory and Applications, at 137, Table 16.8
(1980).
32. T. Johns. Environmental Pathways of Radioactivi rY to Man. in 3 Nuclear Power Technology:
Nuclear Radiation at 265. Table 21.2 (W. Marshall ed. 1983).
33. Id. at 168, 179. 189.
34. Id. at 190-92.
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TABLE 3

Radioisotopes Selected for Study*
Name
cesium- 17 13Cs
cobalt-60
iron-55
krypton-85
strontium-90
tritium

Abbreviation
*"Co
"Fe
" Kr
'Sr
3H

Physical
HalF-Life
29.7
5.3
2.6
10.3
27.7
12.3

years
years
years
years
years
years

Toxicity
medium
medium
high
low
very high
low

*Sources: Choppin and Rydberg"' and Johns,':

and other foods.3 5 This isotope also accumulates in freshwater fish at
concentrations 30 times that in their marine environment. 6
Tritium has a physical half-life of roughly twelve years and hence also
tends to accumulate environmentally after being emitted, but it is generally thought to be less toxic to humans than strontium-90 because of
its relatively rapid excretion after ingestion and because of the relatively
low energy level of its beta ray emissions." Tritium emissions do not
concentrate biologically but rather seem to disperse uniformly in the
circulating surface waters of the hemisphere in which they have been
discharged. This dispersion of tritium constitutes one of the "long-term
sources of world-wide irradiation."'
Krypton-85, with a half-life of about a decade, is not absorbed by the
human body, has low solubility in water, and disperses rapidly in the
hemispheric troposphere of its discharge.' According to Eichholz, however, the rapidly rising sea-level concentration of "Kr in the northern
atmosphere, due only in part to nuclear power emissions, does pose "an
ethical dilemma associated with the prospect of a more than tenfold
increase in ... [its global) inventory over the next 25 years if unrestricted
release is permitted to continue. "' Both cobalt-60 and iron-55 have
shorter half-lives than those materials previously mentioned, but these
two isotopes are relatively toxic and also tend to concentrate biologically
in marine life.4 '
What exactly has been the environmental record of the U.S. nuclear
35. G. Eichholz, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power 314 (1985). T. Johns. supra note 32,
at 168.
36. G. Eichholz. supra note 35. at 369.
37. Id. at 326.
38. T. Johns, supra note 32, at 199-200.
39. Id. at 184-85.
40. G. Eichholz, supra note 35, at 314.
41. Id. at 369; T. Johns. supra note 32. at 194.
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power industry as measured by annual emissions of these six isotopes?
The official data summarized in Figure I do not provide a simple answer
to this question. Aggregate, or industry-wide, emissions of cobalt-60
showed no clear trend from 1974 through 1984, but those of krypton85, strontium-90, and cesium-137 tended to decline, whereas those of
tritium and iron-55 tended to rise.'
Although this emissions record does not suggest a common trend for
all the materials studied, the observation of declining or stable aggregate
emissions for four of the six isotopes is quite impressive given the dramatic
expansion of the U.S. nuclear power industry which occurred from 1974
through 1984. During that interval, the number of operating power reactors nearly doubled and output of nuclear electricity more than tripled.
Hence, the propensity of the average operating nuclear plant to emit
certain isotopes declined sharply during the decade preceding 1984, especially discharges of krypton-85, strontium-90, and cesium- 137 (see
Appendix A).
These aggregate discharge trends can be explained in part by the preference of nuclear utility executives for the pressurized water reactor (PWR)
instead of its boiling water reactor (BWR) rival after 1974. As Eichholz
points out, the use of boric acid in the coolant water of PWRs leads to
relatively high production of tritium within that type of power reactor.43
Once generated, tritium is difficult to separate from cooling water and
tends to be discharged. As a consequence, PWRs emitted nearly 20 times
as much tritium per unit of electricity generated in 1974 compared to
BWRs. Thus, the combination of the general expansion of the U.S.
nuclear power indtistry and the technological shift towards PWRs after
1974 tended to increase aggregate annual emissions of tritium, even
though the propensity of PWRs to emit tritium did improve after 1976
(see Table 4).
On the other hand, the technology of BWRs tends to generate relatively
large volumes of krypton-85 as well as other noble gases, and "[olwing
to their chemical inertness they diffuse fairly readily through cracks and
pores in [fuel rodi cladding and piping. . . ."" In 1974, for instance,
BWRs discharged nearly 100 times as much krypton-85 per unit of electricity generated as PWRs in the United States. Hence, the shift to PWR
technology after 1974 helped to decrease the industry-wide emission of
that isotope sharply by the early 1980s.
The eventual supremacy of PWR technology can account for only part
of the radioactive emission record of the United States nuclear power
42. These conclusions can be verified by regressing aggregate emissions linearly on a time trend
variable and inspecting the sign and significance of the coefficient on the time variable.
43. G. Eichholz, supra note 35, at 176,
44. Id. at 312-14.
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industry, however. In addition, the implementation of advanced waste
treatment methods helped to reduce emissions propensities at both BWR
and PWR plants.4 During the years studied, the average tritium discharge
generated by PWR reactors fell roughly 40 percent,
per
and terawatt-hour
the average krypton-85
discharge per terawatt-hour by BWR plants
fell more than 90 percent (see Table 4). To some extent, these reductions
reflected improvements in waste control technology at newly constructed
plants. However, falling emissions propensities also reflect NRC-mandated backfitting of older plants to some degree.4
Another issue raised by the emissions record of the U.S. nuclear power
industry is whether aggregate discharges result from major, exceptional
releases at specific plants or from modest, routine emissions by most
plants. The answer, it turns out, is somewhere between those extremes.
In 1975, for example, the Oconee, South Carolina nuclear station emitted
5,210 curies (Ci) of tritium, over 22 percent of the U.S. total for that
year. The 1975 median site emission of nearly 140 Ci suggests, however,
that several dozen of the 52 power reactors operating at that time were
emitting much smaller quantities of tritium which, taken together, contributed substantially to the United States total.
In a similar fashion, the 1978 discharge of 34.5 Ci of cesium-137 by
the Turkey Point, Florida facility amounted to 72 percent of the unusually
high aggregate release during that year. However, despite the exceptional
"event" which took place at Turkey Point in 1978, half of the nation's
nuclear sites reported discharges of at least .036 Ci and eleven recorded
emissions at or above 0.36 Ci. Hence, aggregate emissions of radioactive
materials from the U.S. nuclear, power industry often reflect some combination of exceptional "events" at particular plants and routine operation
of the industry as a whole.
From an environmental perspective, however, this focus on the annual
aggregate discharges by the nuclear power industry is somewhat misleading since the discharged isotopes often have lengthy half-lives and
hence tend to persist and accumulate in the environment long after their
moments of emission. Thus, the current environmental impact of the
nuclear power industry depends not just upon its present discharges of
various isotopes into the environment, but also upon the accumulated
stocks of those isotopes within the environment associated with the industry's earlier operations.
Using the emissions data summarized in Appendix A, we have estimated the inventories of the six isotopes within the environment at the
45. For a lengthy discussion of radiation waste treatment methods, see id. at 277-304.
46. In a September 1983 policy statement, the Commission limited staff imposition of backfitting
regulations and created an informal appeal process to hear licensee objections to such backfitting
requirements. I NRC Ann. Rep. 2 (1983).
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end of various years as a consequence of the 1974-84 operation of the
U.S. nuclear power industry. Since published data do not report at what
precise moment within each calendar year these emissions occurred, we
have utilized the conservative assumption that the entire annual emission
of every isotope from every operating power reactor occurred every year
on January 1. For each year, then, the end-of-year inventory of a particular
isotope within the environment has been calculated as the undecayed
portion of the sum of that year's emission and the inventory inherited
from the previous year.47
This estimating procedure tends to give a low estimate of the actual
environmental inventories at the end of each year since the emissions of
that year have, by assumption, had the maximum period within the year
to decay radioactively. We should add that our accumulation estimates
are also conservative in that they totally ignore the undecayed portions
of emissions discharged prior to 1974, the reason being that pre-1974
data are so fragmentary and unreliable.
Our accumulation estimates appear in Figure 2 and suggest some startling conclusions. The main result is that all six isotopes tended to accumulate environmentally from 1974 through 1984 as a result of the
industry's operations during that period. In the case of cobalt-60 and
krypton-85, however, those inventories appear to have peaked before
1984, although they remained higher in 1984 than they had been in the
mid 1970s. In the cases of tritium, iron-55, strontium-90, and cesium137, no clear peak had been reached by the end of 1984.
The growth of these environmental inventories is striking, given the
emissions record of the nuclear industry. In the case of tritium, for example, the aggregate emission fluctuated around an annual average of
23,377 curies from 1975 through 1984, but during that same period, the
environmental inventory of tritium increased more than five-fold. In a
similar fashion, the environmental inventory of strontium-90 increased
more than four-fold from 1974 through 1984 even though the annual
emission of that material fell by more than 90 percent during the same
period. A similar, but somewhat less dramatic, story could be told for
cesium-137 as well. Hence, falling aggregate emissions of radioactive
materials are not necessarily sufficient to prevent growing environmental
concentrations for those isotopes with lengthy half-lives. Only dramatic
cuts in aggregate discharges of some isotopes can guarantee stable or
falling environmental stocks of radioactivity associated with power reactor
operations.
47. This method of estimation can be represented as 1, = (1-d) - (E + I,.), where I is the
environmental inventory of an isotope at the end of year t, E is the emission of that isotope into the
environment at the beginning of year t, and d is the percentage of a mass of the isotope which
decays during a year's time.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Several policy implications seem to follow from these empirical results.
One is that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission needs to pay closer
attention to routine radioactive emissions by the nuclear power industry
as a whole and to their aggregate effect on environmental quality, not
-just focus on the risk of occasional, major releases at particular sites.
This balanced approach to nuclear power regulation is particularly important in light of the industry's continued expansion, and it is also
consistent with the NRC's own inaugural mandate. "
Another policy implication of our analysis is that the NRC needs to
distinguish clearly between the instruments and goals of its regulatory
efforts. NRC review, inspection, and enforcement activities during the
design, construction, and operation of reactors can help to influence
emissions of various isotopes into the environment. However, regulating
flows of radioactivity into the environment is only a means to an end.
The goal of NRC regulation should be to prevent hazardous accumulations
of radioactive materials within the environment, regardless of the moment
when those materials were discharged. As Figures 1 and 2 suggest, the
NRC and nuclear power industry have made substantial progress in reducing the annual aggregate discharges of some materials, but that progress has not been sufficient to prevent the environmental accumulation
of certain isotopes. Hence, the shrinkage of emissions flows may not
have occurred rapidly enough to achieve the public policy goals of maintaining the level of environmental quality and protecting public health
and safety.'9
This conclusion hinges, however, upon the thorny issue of just how
much environmental radioactivity is "safe" from society's perspective.
The NRC itself is apparently satisfied that its regulatory efforts have
prevented substantial damage to environmental quality and public health
by the nuclear power industry. After all, the Commission requires that
"routine releases of radioactive materials in effluents from . . . power
reactors and any resultant public exposure be kept 'as low as reasonably
achievable"' and claims that discharges have been "[oin the whole, ...
small fractions of the limits set forth in NRC regulations."i" Even the
"traumatic" accident at Three Mile Island is expected to "produce be48. I NRC Ann. Rep. 6 (1975).
49. This is not to suggest that the NRC has totally ignored potential accumulation of radioactivity

within the environment after reactor discharges have taken place. As Sailor and Colbert have noted
in an NRC-sponsored technical report. "NRC regulations ...

requires [sic] the nuclear power plant

licensee to conduct surveys of the environs, including measurements of levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive materials as necessary to demonstrate compliance." V.Sailor & J. Colbert.
Summary of Historical Experience With Releases of Radioactive Materials From Commercial Nuclear
Power Plants in the United States, at 37 (1985) (NRC Doc. No. NUREG/CR 4068).
50. 1 NRC Ann. Rep. 10, 46 (1975).
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Figure I
Annual Erhissions of Selected Materials
by U.S Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,
1974-1984
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Figure 2
Environmental Accumulations of Selected Materials
Due to U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Operations,
1974-1984
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tween none and one additional fatal cancer," according to an investigation
sponsored by the Commission."
These optimistic claims ignore the fact, however, that estimates of the
public health effects of "low-level" concentrations of environmental radioactivity are subject to a great degree of uncertainty. As noted by
Eisenbud, "[tihere are inherent statistical problems that prevent us from
measuring the effects of low-level radiation."" Saunders and Wade point
out that
estimates of these hazards to man [sic] arise largely from a rather
limited number of cases where groups have received sufficiently high
doses for the effects to be measured against the general background
of other risks ... There is continuing debate as to how the human
data for... [these) groups.., should be extrapolated to the much
levels associated with the operation of the nuclear inlower dose
3
dustry.

The most widely accepted model, recommended by the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and utilized in the postTMI special inquiry commissioned by the NRC, is that there is no radiation dose which is perfectly safe and that there is a linear relationship
between radiation dose and cancer risk. 4 However, Lambert observes
that
[llinear, linear-quadratic, quadratic, and other models have been
fitted to the dose-response data.... The choice of dose-effect relations at high doses can result in risk estimates differing by an order
of magnitude at low doses .... [Gloodness of fit cannot really be
to fit the
the arbiter of truth because in
55 many cases all models seem
data tolerably at low doses.
How should nuclear utility regulation proceed in the face of such
scientific uncertainty? One response would be to observe that scientific
assessments of the seriousness of radiation health effects have increased
repeatedly during recent decades. In 1934, for example, the ICRP rec51. Special Inquiry Group, supra note 15. vol. 1at 153.
52. Eisenbud. Sources of Ionizing Radiation Exposure, 26 Environment 33 (1984). W. Wood,
Nuclear Safety: Risks and Regulations 35 (1983) and S. Cohn. supra note 5. at 329, have also noted
this high degree of uncertainty about the biological effects of low-level radiation.
53. Saunders & Wade, Radiation and Its Control, in 3 Nuclear Power Technology: Nuclear
Radiation 12 (1983).
54. Special Inquiry Group, supra note 15. vol. I! at 403. This does not mean, however, that we
endorse the linear no-threshold assumption of the ICRP. It is instructive that a recent ICRP decision
to maintain its existing occupational radiation dose guidelines despite a reassessment of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki bomb survivor data which suggests that "radiation is more dangerous than we used
to think" provoked The Lancet to editorialize as follows on 28 November 1987: "It is to be hoped
that ICRP's decision.. . was not tempered by the financial and practical consequences of a reduction
[in recommended radiation exposurel." I The Lancet 1245-47 (1987).
55. Lambert, Radiation-Induced Cancer Risks, I The Lancet 1045 (1988).
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ommended a maximum occupational exposure of 70 rem per year.' That
level was reduced to 15 rem per year in 1950, and once again to 5 rem
per year in 1977." To some extent, this tightening of radiation protection
standards reflects the long latency period between radiation exposure and
onset of resulting cancers and leukemias. That is, past estimates of the
dose-response relationship were too low because the complete, long-term
health effects of past radiation exposure had not yet been observed.5"
Extrapolating this past trend into the future, we would predict further
reductions in exposure levels recommended by radiation protection researchers.
A second response would be to require the NRC to take full account
of the "prospect costs" associated with the operation of nuclear facilities.
As a recent analysis of the controversial plans to site a federal high-level
nuclear waste repository has shown, uncertainties about the potential
environmental impact of nuclear plants can impose substantial losses of
subjective utility on nearby residents, whether or not releases of radioactivity ever actually occur. In fact, "'ifthe welfare of future generations
is discounted at a constant rate or not at all, . . . losses in the tens of
trillions of dollars are possible. These values ... are not contingent

costs, amenable to insurance treatments." 9 Incorporation of prospect
costs into cost-benefit analyses of nuclear power is desirable and would
surely lower the calculated social rate of return on that form of energy
investment.
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, we agree with Freudenburg that
nuclear power regulation is a field in which scientific expertise has an
important, but limited, role to play.' Because the health effects of radiation exposure are intrinsically uncertain, and because environmental
accumulations of radioactivity cannot, in general, be "cleaned up" if it
becomes clear that they are more hazardous than once thought, it seems
reasonable and prudent for the NRC to tighten its emissions regulations
on the nuclear power industry so that no further increases in environmental
inventories of isotopes with lengthy half-lives could result in future public
regret about the surprisingly severe health effects of nuclear power. That
is, stricter nuclear emissions standards today would help to protect society
56. A rem measures the amount of energy from a radioactive source which isabsorbed per
kilogram of tissue, after adjusting for differences in the biological destructiveness of different types
of radioactivity, for example x-rays, neutrons, heavy ions.
57. Saunders & Wade, supra note 53, at 16-17.
58. Lambert, supra note 55. at 1045. reports that during the past eleven years "the number of
excess deaths I among Japanese atomic bomb survivorsl has increased from 100 to 300.... "
59. Rosenman, Fort & Budd, Perceptions, Fear,and Economic Loss: An Applicationof Prospect
Theor to Environmental Decision Making, 21 Pol'y Sci. 327, 345 (1988).
60. Freudenburg, Perceived Risk, Real Risk: Social Science and the Art of Probabilistic Risk

Assessment, 242 Sci. 44, 48 (Oct. 7, 1988).
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against unexpected, but unacceptably high, health consequences in the
years to come. 6'
Finally, even though the global warming problem associated with fossil
' we cannot agree with
fuel use is "real, large, serious, and complex," 62
those who suggest that "nuclear power should be . . .resurrected, restored, rediscovered, or revisited" as an energy policy option. 3 Both
accumulation of carbon dioxide within the atmosphere and buildup of
radioactivity within the environment pose long-term threats to the sustainability of human society. Hence, both CO2 releases and nuclear emissions need to be strictly limited if posterity is to prosper. "[If] nuclear
power is to be advocated to mitigate the greenhouse effect, because it is
the lesser of the two evils,"" then its proponents must be able to show
that the industry can continue to expand its operations and simultaneously
sharply reduce its aggregate emissions of long-lived radioactive pollutants.

61. This argument admittedly cannot be confirmed empirically. It is simply an ethical argument
in favor of prudence in the face of uncertainty and against discounting of future health consequences.
We concur with Schulze. Brookshire, and Sandier who argue that "assuming future generations are
unlikely to be compensated ... a zero percent rate of discount may be appropriate from a consequentialist ethical perspective.- Schulze. Brookshire & Sandier. The Social Rate of Discountfor
Nuclear Waste Storage: Economics. or Ethics. 21 Nat. Res. J.811. 832 (1981).
62. Landsberg. Coal Revisited. 94 Resources 9 (1989).
63. Ahearoe. Will Nuclear Power Recover in a Greenhouse?. 94 Resources 14 (1989).
64. Id. at IS.
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